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1 Introduction
Understanding central–local 
relations in China
John A. Donaldson
China’s leaders are compelled to rule a unitary state while simultaneously 
sharing power with lower levels of government. In a country with such a massive 
population and continental size, no central leader – no matter how powerful, no 
matter how feared – can rule without the active participation of local govern-
ments. Orders issued from the aerie of any of China’s ancient capitals meant 
nothing if officials further down the line paid little attention to them. Moreover, 
no ruler can possibly be knowledgeable enough to understand fully all local situ-
ations and provide nuanced orders accordingly. Thus, in order to effectively rule 
a unified China from a unitary government, central leaders throughout history 
had to secure some degree of compliance from local governments and grant 
them at least some measure of discretion in implementation.
 In short, China’s leaders have had to balance carefully central control and 
local discretion. This balance is difficult to achieve, and even more difficult to 
maintain. To make matters worse, no balance between local and central power 
is ever ideal; no pattern ever fixed. On the one hand, too much central control 
could sap energy and innovation, with inflexible implementation creating 
unnecessary local problems. On the other hand, too much local power could 
create centrifugal forces that might render a country as massive as China even 
more difficult to govern. How does China’s central leadership ensure the loyalty 
and compliance of its subordinate local governments and allow for flexible 
policy implementation, while simultaneously projecting power down to the 
remotest areas? This question reflects a fundamental ruling dilemma of leader-
ship in large unitary states. One scholar described this millennia- old dilemma of 
the push–pull of central versus local decision- makers as follows:
Because of this tension between the centralizing predilections of the rulers 
and the decentralizing dictates of the environment, the perennial problem 
of Chinese rulers has been to prevent power from slipping from center 
to the periphery. . . . Whatever the device, and whatever the temporary 
success achieved, the basic contradiction in the system soon manifested 
itself again: few decision- making centers allow power to be retained at the 
center; this power, however, is likely to be illusory since the center soon 
becomes bogged down with the great volume of decision- making and 
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communication demanded of it. Many decision- making centers, on the 
other hand, ease the burden on the center and allow it, in theory at least, to 
deal with important policy matters only. The likely outcome of this arrange-
ment, however, is that regional centers are liable to usurp the powers and 
prerogatives of the center.
(Whitney 1970, p. 166)
Because of this dilemma, China’s power has continuously vacillated between 
levels of government. This is no trivial issue, for politics is at stake – whose pref-
erence prevails, who gets what – and these vital issues depend on the formal and 
informal workings of this central–local dynamic.
 Among academics, much has been written about how to understand the rela-
tionship between central and local governments. Yet the domains in which this 
relationship is set have been less systematically studied. Of course, some of these 
dimensions have received individual, focused study. Yet a comparative study of 
several dimensions can address vital questions that have not yet received full 
attention. Does this relationship play out differently when the stakes are material 
compared to when they are non- material? Do finance and welfare policies have 
the same meaning for the central government as they do for the local? Do the 
advantages and disadvantages of decentralization of power vary depending on 
the issue at stake? Who wins and loses when power is distributed in differing 
ways across different issues?
 This book addresses these and other important questions by examining crit-
ical issues over which the central and local governments tussle. Issues such as 
investment control, government finance and taxation, regional policy, culture 
protection and promotion, policy implementation, social welfare, and even 
foreign policy – the nature of the conflict varies within each of these areas. Each 
chapter analyzes a single issue, examining the balance of power between central 
and local levels. Naturally, there are many other issues that could be discussed – 
a book this size cannot cover all the different dimensions of conflict between the 
center and the local. The hope is that by addressing a variety of issues, a more 
nuanced understanding of central–local relations can be reached.
 Each chapter author was asked to review the relevant debates pertaining to 
changes in the balance of power between central and local governments for one 
particular issue. To this end, each chapter contains a review of the issue and 
traces the changes that have occurred since the start of the reform era. Each 
author was also asked, based on his or her analysis, to make and defend a spe-
cific argument that could help in gauging the balance of power between central 
and relevant local governments, and, as far as possible, help us to understand 
what factors will influence future changes.
 In this process, caution is needed, since the study of the balance of power 
between central and local governments is often based on a false premise: that 
there is limited power to share, and that as one level gains power, other levels 
lose it. Yet in many ways, power among levels is not zero- sum. After all, 
decentralization, theoretically a loss for the center, was partially a strategy for 
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deepening support for reform, a major priority of the center. Thus, the empow-
erment of local governments, far from signaling the weakness of the center, was 
planned by the center in order to pursue its core goals. Moreover, decentraliza-
tion can strengthen the state’s overall capacity not only by helping reforms reach 
the grassroots, but also by presenting a safety valve for regionalist pressures, 
helping to preserve the state overall. Part of the challenge reformers faced was 
the need to rapidly institutionalize after the anti- bureaucratic reaction of the 
Cultural Revolution and the chaos that ensued in its wake. Since 1978, China’s 
government apparatus has been institutionalizing steadily, increasing the total 
power that governments on different levels can share (e.g., Li 1998; Chung 
1998). Thus, allowing provincial and other local governments to take a role in 
this effort does not inherently weaken the center; in practice, it helped to con-
struct the state as a whole.
 Yet even though the distribution of power is not zero- sum, central and local 
priorities are often in conflict. On the surface, policies that secure borders, 
promote domestic political stability, and check inflation and budgetary expendi-
tures should be universally supported. Yet even on these “common ground” 
issues, central and local governments are often at odds – so much more so in 
respect of issues where interests clearly diverge. Conflict emerges from several 
sources. First, local governments often pursue local interests and adopt policies 
that contradict central initiatives and priorities, even in domains that should 
clearly be part of the central purview. For example, it is a central government 
responsibly to maintain fiscal stability by controlling inflation. Yet local govern-
ments have often invested excessively, fueling inflation – a behavior that the 
central government struggles to control (see Chapter 3). Local governments 
have engaged in foreign policy, and while this behavior is usually consistent with 
and supportive of centrally determined foreign policy, some local government 
actions are not wholly in tune with central priorities (see Chapter 9). Second, 
abuse of local power can often threaten stability when local residents, both rural 
and urban, organize to resist the encroachment of their rights. This can occur 
when powerful forces threaten the livelihoods of local citizens, leading to resist-
ance. In these cases, ordinary people often expect – or at least hope – that the 
central government will intervene. Third, if central and local governments 
struggle over such political and economic issues, how much more might they 
clash on less fundamental issues, such as regional development policy, welfare 
policy, and other issues in which interests and priorities vary to an even greater 
degree? To be sure, China’s governments at all levels are increasingly capable 
and institutionalized, allowing levels of government to divide an increasingly 
larger pie. Yet the issue of who gets to set China’s course and establish vital pol-
icies remains one of the major issues in understanding Chinese politics.
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Central and local governments in the reform era of the 
People’s Republic of China
Comprehending the issues outlined above requires an understanding of China’s 
administrative hierarchy – the different levels of government that often vie for 
power. Yet, as Chapter 6 documents, the tensions in the system have sometimes 
compelled stronger measures that not only shift power up or down the hier-
archy, but also alter the hierarchy itself. China’s administrative hierarchy can 
appear to be fixed and well established. Thus, it is important to remind our-
selves that over China’s history, different dynasties have not only shifted power 
among levels of government, but have also added or subtracted levels in order 
to maintain control and monitor subordinate governments (Fitzgerald 2002; 
Zhou 2005).
 Today, the number of levels of government in China has more or less settled 
at four. Yet even here, the story is more complex than it initially appears. The 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides a clear legal basis for 
only three forms of local government – provinces, counties, and townships. 
Article 95 establishes People’s Congresses and People’s Governments in prov-
inces and in provincial- level municipalities directly under the central government, 
as well as in counties, county- level municipalities, municipal districts, townships, 
ethnic minority townships, and towns, with standing committees established at 
every level from county and above (Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China, Article 95). Article 111 establishes residents’ committees and villagers’ 
committees in villages, as well as detailing the process for these committees’ elec-
tion, and their powers and functions (Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China, Article 111). Yet most forms of prefecture- level governments (with the 
exception of autonomous prefectures, which are mentioned in the constitution) 
and sub- provincial municipalities are not mentioned in the constitution.
 In addition to providing a constitutional basis for local governments, the 
constitution clearly establishes the central government’s formal hierarchy over 
lower levels of government. The powers formally held in central hands include 
the establishment of new subservient units, the approval of most boundary 
changes, and the annulment of local regulations and decisions that contradict 
central law. Specifically, the constitution lists as a function of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress the power to approve the establishment of provinces, auto-
nomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government as 
well as to approve the establishment of special administrative regions (Constitu-
tion of the People’s Republic of China, Article 62). The approval of the geo-
graphic divisions of each unit is the purview of China’s State Council 
(Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 89), with the exception 
of the boundaries at township level, which can be set by provincial- level govern-
ments (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 107). Moreover, 
the constitution privileges the central government, granting it authority and 
legitimacy over local governments. For instance, among the functions and 
powers of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress is listed 
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the power to annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state 
power of provincial- level governments that contravene China’s constitution, 
statutes, or administrative rules and regulations (Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, Article 67).
 Irrespective of legal status, the number of levels of sub- national government 
now formally stands at four as shown in Table 1.1: province, prefecture, county, 
and township. These sub- national governments also appear in differing forms, 
having variations in different regions – such as in designated ethnic minority 
areas – as well as in urban and rural areas. Furthermore, there are additional 
forms of government that do not strictly “count” as levels, but nevertheless 
perform distinct governmental functions. For instance, China’s 15 deputy 
provincial- level municipalities, though classified at what is considered a half 
level, enjoy additional rights not accorded to prefecture- level municipalities. The 
administrative village, not considered a level of government, performs a number 
of important functions for hundreds of millions of Chinese rural residents. 
Together, the various functions performed by different levels represent a 
complex interweaving of powers, functions, and responsibilities.
 As can be seen in Table 1.1, each level below the center has several types of 
governments, each of which acts somewhat differently and has its own respons-
ibilities. In addition, most levels also have a form that is classified as “auto-
nomous” – areas with large ethnic minority populations that formally have extra 
flexibility and functions (e.g., Lai 2009). Since all of the chapters in this book 
depend on an understanding of the functions and responsibilities of each level 
of government, these are described below.
Province 
Most provinces have landmasses and populations that can rival countries. Always 
important in politics since their establishment during the Yuan dynasty, 
provincial- level governments have been especially empowered under the reform 
era. Under China’s administrative system, there has long been a tension between 
whether the dictates of local leaders should be followed (the chain of command 
on a specific government level is known as kuai), or whether orders from higher 
up the administrative ladder within a given ministry or government body should 
prevail (the chain of command that passes between government levels is known 
as tiao). For instance, what should an official in a county transportation office 
do upon receiving conflicting orders from the county’s mayor (kuai) and from 
superiors within the transportation ministry (tiao)? The conflict between tiao 
and kuai makes communication and coordination difficult even at the best of 
times. When orders and plans conflict, it can reduce administrative efficiency 
and even bring administration to a deadlock. Because of the dual stakeholders, 
accountability becomes more difficult. Reformers have used the tiao–kuai 
system to enhance the power of provincial governments. With the launch of the 
reform era, and especially after these kinds of moves toward “soft centraliza-
tion,” provincial- level decision- making has become more autonomous and 
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influential (Mertha 2005). County- and township- level officials are beholden to 
their superiors higher up the administrative ladder (tiao) up to the provincial 
level, rather than their superiors within the local government (kuai). Provinces 
are now responsible for setting the direction and strategy for development in 
their areas, and make numerous decisions that have profound impacts on their 
population. While the province enjoys autonomy in many areas, it is expected to 
do so within the framework set by central directives. Generally speaking, for 
most of the reform period, as long as provincial governments’ decisions remain 
within these parameters, particularly for economic decisions, the central govern-
ment is content to grant them leeway and flexibility (e.g., Donaldson 2009; 
Leng 2009). Constant bargaining and jockeying for power is one result of the 
ambiguities that now characterize the system.
Deputy- provincial municipality
The reform era ushered in the establishment of deputy- provincial municipalities 
– currently 15 major metropolises administratively positioned at a half level 
between province and prefecture.1 Unlike most other levels of government, this 
level is not specified in the constitution, but was established through decisions 
made by the central government. These large and important municipalities were 
established as a category in the early 1980s – “key economic cities” designed to 
facilitate urbanization and spur regional economic growth. Under the deputy- 
provincial designation, these municipalities have been given a wider latitude for 
establishing their own development policies; are able to deal directly with the 
central government in resolving a range of key issues, including budgets and 
revenue sharing; and are given provincial- level treatment in terms of approving 
construction projects and the use of foreign exchange (Chung 2009).
Prefecture
In many ways, the role of prefecture- level governments has expanded as much 
or even more than that of the provincial level (Chien 2009). Administratively, 
there are three basic forms of prefecture- level governments, each of which 
behaves quite differently from the others. First, until 1978 regional administra-
tive offices (diqu xinzheng gongshu) dominated. Less autonomous levels in their 
own right, these “dispatch offices” (paichu jigou) were staffed with provincial 
officials, and directly represented the province. However, with reform has come 
rapid urbanization and with that, a second major type of prefecture, namely the 
prefectural- level municipality (diji shi), has increased both in number and in 
power.2 These tend to be the largest municipalities in each province and, in fact, 
some prefecture- level municipalities have come to rival provinces in resources 
and influence. Due to these municipalities being closer to the ground and 
having significant resources, provincial and central governments depend on 
prefecture- level municipalities to implement development policies. These 
include setting and implementing urban policy and planning; providing social 
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and protective services; providing public goods such as transportation, energy, 
and communications infrastructure; and managing the natural environment (Wu 
et al. 2007, cited in Chien 2009). In addition, these kinds of prefectures have 
traditionally led the county- level regions and counties that are beneath them 
(Chien 2009). Finally, the third type of prefecture is the autonomous prefecture 
or zhou (in Inner Mongolia these are called meng or leagues). Currently only 29 
such governments remain, located in areas dominated by ethnic minorities. 
Unlike dispatch offices, these autonomous prefectures are an actual level of gov-
ernment, written in China’s constitution, and possess their own authority to 
administer the counties beneath them. However, they are unlike prefecture- level 
municipalities in that they are not focused primarily on urbanization (Chien 
2009).
County
County- level governments are also divided into rural and urban manifestations. 
Three major forms can be found in China today. First, there are county- level 
urban districts (qu). Each provincial- or prefecture- level municipality will typic-
ally have a number of such districts, led by officials who are appointed by and 
directly responsible to the municipality above them. Second, a county, irrespec-
tive of whether it lies within a prefecture- level municipality, can be given the 
designation of a county- level municipality (xianji shi).3 These county- level 
municipalities are one level lower and much less formidable than prefecture- level 
municipalities, and are thus less powerful. Third, in rural areas, counties (simply, 
xian) enjoy considerable autonomy in administering their regions. Thus, the 
power of the county- level government, like that of the prefecture, but unlike 
that of the province, varies tremendously depending on whether it is district, 
municipality or county (Lam 2009). 
 In general, however, counties have become less powerful over time. First, as 
detailed in Chapter 5, many counties have shifted from counties to county- level 
districts that are largely subservient to the prefecture- level municipalities above 
them. Second, while the fiscal resources of counties vary a great deal, they have 
generally decreased significantly relative to other levels since the tax sharing 
reform of 1994. Third, the county has been compelled to take up a great 
number of expenditure items, as higher level governments have shifted expendi-
tures – but not flexibility in implementing the programs funded by such expen-
ditures – to county and township levels. This has especially affected poor 
counties (Lam 2009).
Township
Township- level governments also vary by urban and rural areas. In urban areas, 
subdistricts (jie dao) are township- level, and are charged with managing a 
number of service programs. In rural areas, towns and townships (both are 
effectively the same and are on the same level of government, though towns 
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tend to be somewhat more urbanized) administer rather large areas with popu-
lations typically in the tens of thousands. Townships have been weakened by the 
empowerment of provinces under the tiao–kuai system. The number of offices 
that are directly under higher government authorities (tiao tiao) has increased 
dramatically, causing a “hollowing out” of township government. Most 
employees in townships these days represent tiao government offices, and thus 
primarily represent higher levels of government (Zhong 2009). Under this 
system township officials spend a great deal of effort bargaining with county- 
level governments, yet must nevertheless implement policies that may be under-
funded and with which they may disagree. This has meant that levels above the 
township are directing an increasing number of functions, reducing the town-
ship government’s authority.
Administrative village
Under the towns and townships are administrative villages, each of which typic-
ally administers several natural villages. The more than 600,000 administrative 
villages are not part of the official governmental system, yet they directly affect 
the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese rural residents. For many such resi-
dents, administrative villages are the primary point of contact with governance. 
Village- level leaders are temporary and not part of the personnel management 
system; thus they are handled separately from the government and party person-
nel systems (e.g., Kung et al. 2009).
 Since reform, one of the most difficult and distasteful aspects of village gov-
ernment has been the need to extract taxes from often poor farmers and other 
rural residents, and to enforce China’s draconian family planning policies – tasks 
made easier by village- level elections that provide more legitimacy to village 
leaders (O’Brien 2001). However, since the abolition of agricultural taxes, the 
flow has reversed. Currently, the main tasks of village government are distrib-
uting welfare and providing public goods such as rural infrastructure. In addi-
tion, village leaders adjudicate disputes among rural residents. Yet, the abolition 
of the agricultural tax system has also made village- level financial problems that 
much more intractable. The central government is responsible for the salaries of 
village leaders, yet fewer resources are available for development projects, infra-
structure, or other needs of the village. This has led many villages to work with 
township governments to attract revenue- generating opportunities, which often 
have little actual commercial value and are often disruptive of the village 
economy (Chen 2014). With elections, do the village officials place the often 
conflicting interests of the central state, the village, or their own families first? 
While the answer varies from village to village, a survey of 400 administrative 
villages reveals that state interests took precedence for most village leaders, fol-
lowed by their own families, and finally local interests. The fact that central 
interests are typically the priority for these grassroots leaders underscores the 
reach of the central state, from the highest levels of government in Beijing, all 
the way down to the most remote village in China (Kung et al. 2009).
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The issues discussed in this book
The levels of government discussed above provide the setting for the chapters 
that follow. Each chapter focuses on a different issue or dimension that helps to 
illuminate the interplay between central and local levels of government. Since 
much of the struggle for power emerges between the center and the immediate 
next level, most chapters focus on the center’s relationship with the province. 
However, to ensure the reader gains a full understanding of the issues at stake, 
some chapters also analyze the center’s relationship with additional levels, such 
as the prefecture, county, and even township.
 Chapter 2 focuses on China’s central–local relations through the lens of fiscal 
policy and revenue sharing. Because fiscal matters involve resources, fiscal policy 
is commonly viewed as a zero- sum contest, where power is measured in terms 
of net gains. Professor S. Philip Hsu, by contrast, adopts Steven Lukes’ (2005) 
three- dimensional conceptualization of power not to analyze net gains but 
intentions, behaviors, and consequences. In contrast to the commonly held view 
that provinces overpowered the center in the early days of the reform period, 
Hsu argues that both the provincial and central governments held compatible 
preferences. Hsu also argues that the tax sharing system, commonly seen as 
a victory of the central government over the provinces, instead reflects a 
compromise between the two parties. Thus, adopting a non- zero-sum per-
spective and applying a more political definition of power recasts our under-
standing of the conflicts between central and local governments with regard to 
fiscal policy.
 In Chapter 3 Associate Professor Yukyung Yeo expands on the research on 
investment control which has thus far mainly been confined to studies on the 
Deng Xiaoping era. In contrast to most previous analyses, Yeo analyzes the 
balance of power by dividing power into two separate aspects: administrative 
supervision authority and political control. According to this, both central and 
provincial governments retain a strong influence over investment control, but in 
different proportions. Yeo argues that while strong non- state finance has 
enhanced local administrative supervision over investment activities, the tools of 
political control remain intact and have been largely dominated by the center. 
Yeo cautions, however, that conflicts between the preferences of central and 
local authorities are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future and, there-
fore, Beijing will continue to have to monitor closely local governments’ invest-
ment decisions. Because recentralization does little to alter the basic interests of 
local governments, their “investment hunger” will continue to create conflicts 
between central and local governments.
 Chapter 4 reviews the formulation of China’s overall regional development 
strategy, the planning of functional zones, and several other aspects of China’s 
multi- dimensional regional policy. Based on this analysis, Professor Long Yang 
argues that since 1978 China’s regional development policy has been balanced 
between central and local governments. The central government has been 
involved in choosing experimental pilot programs, while the local governments 
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are mainly responsible for experimenting with different strategies for develop-
ment. The energy and innovation of the local governments have combined with 
the overall guidance and coordination of the center to create conditions for 
rapid development. Thus, it is the interaction between the central and local gov-
ernments that has made regional policy much more effective than would other-
wise have been expected. These policies will become even more important as 
the new administration has, since 2012, focused on regional governance as a 
driver of growth, urbanization, and reform. Yet because much of this develop-
ment will take place across multiple provinces, the center will be called on for a 
greater role in coordination.
 Chapter 5 focuses on China’s administrative hierarchy, and how conflicts 
between central and local governments have centered on changes in administra-
tive levels that transfer power from the center to the most obscure urban neigh-
borhood or remote rural village. Associate Professor John A. Donaldson argues 
that industrialization and urbanization have challenged China’s administrative 
hierarchy. Because the levels of government that reformers inherited in 1978 
were established in a rigidly controlled and largely agrarian environment, 
China’s administrative hierarchy has changed fundamentally. In particular, the 
empowerment of prefecture- level municipalities, as well as the transfer of 
county- level governments to either urban districts or county- level municipal-
ities, has given power to urban areas at the expense of the interests of vulnerable 
rural areas. These changes have not gone uncontested, as central government 
(particularly the Hu administration), local leaders, and even civil society have 
tried to check this unbridled “urban fever.” Looking to the future, Donaldson 
argues that as previous urbanization efforts have fundamentally reshaped the 
relationships between levels of government in China, the yet more ambitious 
plans of the Xi–Li administration cannot be contained even within the altered 
structure of local administration. Thus, he expects more fundamental changes in 
the administrative hierarchy, as well as a deepening of the problems that 
emerged during previous rounds of urbanization.
 Chapter 6 examines the tugs of war between central and local governments 
that are seen in policy implementation. Professor Jae Ho Chung argues that 
although Beijing is “nearly obsessed” with treating China as a single unified 
entity, the center relies on local governments for implementation because of 
China’s sheer size and the complexity of its society. The result is a complex 
dynamic entailing a significant degree of contention, adjustment, negotiation, 
and noncompliance on the part of local implementers. Chung hypothesizes that 
the degree of local discretion in implementing central policy – assuming other 
things (i.e., patron- clientelism and local fervor) being equal – depends on three 
aspects of policy characteristics: policy scope (selective or encompassing), policy 
nature (involving resources or governance issues), and level of urgency. That is, 
selective, non- urgent policies that involve resources result in the highest degree 
of local discretion while encompassing, urgent policies that entail governance- 
related issues produce the lowest degree of local discretion. Chung tests this 
hypothesis by examining six case policies that vary along these three dimensions, 
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concluding that urgency is paramount, followed by the other two aspects. He 
concludes that:
1 Post- Mao reforms have over time cultivated new environments where the 
overall extent of local discretion in policy implementation has increased.
2 As a result the center has become increasingly concerned with the preval-
ence of local foot- dragging and even defiance.
3 The center is still largely capable of using institutional tools, personnel 
control, and local surveillance to rein in localities on issues that it 
prioritizes.
 In contrast to previous chapters, Chapter 7 turns its attention to an invalu-
able but sometimes non- material issue – that of cultural policy. Professor Tse- 
Kang Leng argues that while political indoctrination and regime legitimacy are 
the main concerns of cultural policy at the central level, it is the base material 
goal of market enlargement that has become the focus of endeavor for local 
governments in China. Due to the vertical command and control wielded by 
the still conservative and unreformed propaganda agencies, local governments 
have only limited autonomy to reorient ideological trends. However, local 
authorities have focused on embracing the market and transforming “culture” 
into a lucrative business in order to boost the local economy and promote urban 
reconstruction. This creates fundamental paradoxes as the development of 
culture often entails trades- offs with its preservation. Leng illustrates these argu-
ments by tracing the balance of power with regard to urban cultural policy 
designed to spur tourism and the promotion of a variety of cultural industries in 
rural and minority areas. He concludes that the contradictory goals of central 
and local governments have created a complex dynamic not only among those 
governments, but also among key members of China’s society bent on exploit-
ing or preserving China’s endangered cultural heritage.
 Chapter 8 addresses China’s evolving social welfare policy. In contrast to the 
relationship between decentralization and development in China in most other 
policy domains, the realm of social welfare has seen different patterns. Professor 
Xufeng Zhu argues that these unique patterns have emerged from the fact that 
local government officials have been strongly encouraged to focus on economic 
growth and development, and have thus largely ignored calls to establish a 
costly, complex, and distracting social welfare regime. Yet, the fact that until 
recently rural residents were largely not covered by an effective welfare system, 
combined with mass migration, the dismantling of the old work unit system, 
and the emergence of millions of laid- off workers demanding new services, has 
meant that the central government has come under intense pressure to reform 
China’s approach to social welfare. Thus, social welfare reform has necessarily 
involved a process of recentralization. Zhu focuses on the center’s use of 
binding targets, special payments, and strengthened personnel management 
to control local governments, allowing the center to compel each locality to 
implement social welfare reforms. He traces these dynamics through a close 
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examination of changes in the basic education, public health, pension insurance, 
and public housing sectors. Zhu concludes by arguing that while recentraliza-
tion indeed strengthened the provision of social welfare in China in recent years, 
many new problems have also emerged. However, these problems, which stem 
from recentralization, will be curbed as China’s central government becomes 
increasingly transparent and responsive to the public. He further argues that 
centralization provides the central government with an opportunity to establish 
a more universal and consolidated social welfare system for China’s most vulner-
able communities.
 Finally, Chapter 9 focuses on an issue that has been all but ignored in the 
study of central–local relations: international relations. Associate Professor 
Mingjiang Li argues that, while it is thought that China’s local governments 
mainly concern themselves with “low politics,” reform and development have 
brought an increased role for local governments in cross- border interactions. 
Despite the fact that international relations scholars are increasingly examining 
the role of domestic actors in international relations, in China studies the role of 
local governments in foreign policy have been all but ignored. Many of these 
governments’ overseas engagements consist of attempts to attract more overseas 
investment and facilitate cross- border trade. Yet Li documents local govern-
ments’ increasing involvement in “high politics,” including Hainan’s involve-
ment in the South China Seas, Yunnan province’s engagements in the restive 
regions in northern Myanmar, and Guangxi province’s engagement with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, Li carefully cau-
tions against exaggerating the role of local governments. Foreign policy remains 
Beijing’s prerogative, and local governments have primarily played a com-
plementary role that strengthens Beijing’s ability to engage in effective foreign 
relations.
Concluding remarks – insights from research on central–
local relations in China
Based on the arguments presented in these chapters, several generalizations 
emerge. First, not surprisingly, each of the issues has been deeply affected by 
decentralization. This is obvious enough in issues such as investment and finance 
– promoting reform in these sectors was a key part of the raison d’être for 
decentralization during the early reform period. Yet even issues such as cultural 
policy and foreign policy have not gone untouched by newly empowered local 
actors. Moreover, in many ways this decentralization has benefitted the nation 
by bringing energy and innovation to a number of areas that, under Mao, had 
been adrift, moribund, or even dysfunctional. However, for all of these issues, 
deep complications have ensued, some anticipated and some unexpected. 
Decentralization has been linked to serious problems such as spiraling inflation, 
staggering levels of local government debt, gaping regional inequality, an 
inability to expect full implementation of certain central policies, a fraying of the 
welfare system, an irrational pace of urbanization, the erosion and destruction of 
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Chinese and minority cultures, and unwanted attempts at meddling in foreign 
policy making. While in most cases the positive impact of decentralization has 
outweighed the costs, these mixed results have led the central government to 
make nearly constant adjustments in an attempt to rebalance the allocation of 
power. Thus, the decades of reform have been full of examples of the ruling 
dilemma referred to earlier.
 Second, the authors nevertheless agree that, despite decentralization and the 
tugs of war between central and local governments that have ensued, the central 
government maintains the upper hand in every issue discussed in this book. As 
the authors point out, the center retains a number of tools needed to maintain 
ultimate control over local governments. The central government retains firm 
control over finance, personnel, and tools of coercion. Moreover, the constitu-
tion clearly legitimizes the central government, enshrining China as a unitary 
state and placing the central government as the ultimate arbiter. There are a 
multitude of decisions – many quite significant – that the center has delegated 
to local governments, and there are even local decisions that have gone directly 
against the wishes of the center. Overall, though, even before the recentraliza-
tion drive of the Xi Jinping administration, the central government has held on 
to enough power to hold sway over a range of issues and areas. This allows the 
center to set the priorities for the country, punish and reward compliance, and 
ultimately influence the norms that shape decision- making. If local level inter-
ests often prevail, it is the center that has the preponderance of influence over 
deciding what those interests are.
 Third, in trying to understand the balance of power between central and 
local forces, most chapters introduce yet another actor that is vital to this 
dynamic. Civil society appears to be increasingly important as a third party that 
affects the way these relations are adjudicated. Public demands are increasingly 
shaping social welfare policy. Civil society has become heavily involved in the 
fight over protecting and exploiting China’s cultural resources. Private busi-
nesses and other non- government actors provide fixed asset investment, and 
these decisions are often out of the control of the government. Foreign policy 
has seen an increase in the role of people- to-people relationships that deepen 
China’s local governments’ relationships with overseas localities. Protests have 
emerged even around issues that seem to be purely administrative – for instance, 
the protests that ensue as counties are converted into urban districts and 
absorbed into prefecture- level municipalities. As civil society’s role in China’s 
political scene morphs in nuanced and complex ways, it increases the complexity 
of the task of gauging the balance of power between China’s central and local 
governments.
 Fourth, and more broadly, the chapters also underscore the difficulties 
endemic to mapping, or even defining, power in this context. Each chapter is 
focused – implicitly or explicitly – on all three of Steven Lukes’ (2005) faces of 
power. The chapters not only ask “who gets what,” but also who gets to set the 
political agenda, as well as who defines the norms under which central–local 
relations play out. In doing so, several thorny issues emerge. For instance, what 
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currency should be used in calculating power? For non- resource issues, this is 
especially problematic. Chapter 7 asks which cultural issues get promoted and 
protected, and what values to assign to culture vis- à-vis other priorities, such as 
economic development. As local governments often “resource- ify” or commod-
itize culture, even as the central government often views culture as an issue of 
identity, the conflict over cultural policy can appear as if it were a conflict of the 
tangible versus the intangible. In any case, gauging a balance of power that 
would help us to understand this conflict over the protection and promotion of 
culture is difficult. Similarly, local governments’ transactions in foreign policy 
have often been resource- based, such as reaching across borders to attract 
foreign investment. Yet the foreign interactions of local governments can also 
be non- tangible, such as when they leverage friendship ties with foreign local 
governments in order to promote national interests, or even participate in the 
shaping of foreign policy priorities, such as Guangxi province’s interactions with 
Southeast Asia.
 Also with regard to evaluating power, the relative value of something that is 
non- tangible is tricky to calculate because it lacks a relationship to something 
like monetary currency that could ease comparisons by offering a convenient 
common denominator. Yet, as our authors point out, even economic issues can 
be hard to quantify when it comes to gauging the relative power of the differing 
and sometimes opposing sides in a conflict. As Hsu asks in Chapter 2, is it the 
party that spends the money that has the upper hand in economic power strug-
gles (as many studying fiscal policy implicitly suggest), or is the more important 
factor not the actual spending of the money, but rather, having the power to 
direct that spending? The different ways of analyzing such struggles lead to 
opposing answers to questions that aim to gauge the balance of power. More-
over, as several chapters underscore, even in the realm of resource- based issues 
power is not zero- sum, and thus the mere existence of a common denominator 
does not make gauging the balance of power that much easier.
 Finally, the authors vary a great deal in their levels of optimism or pessimism 
regarding China’s future, particularly in terms of the ongoing conflicts between 
central and local governments. Long expresses optimism (Chapter 4) for the 
stabilization and promotion of regional policy. Similarly, Zhu (Chapter 8) sees 
recentralization as beneficial for the development of a more serious and fair 
welfare policy. Combined with what he sees as the government’s increasing 
transparency and responsiveness to citizens’ demands, Zhu expects that the 
improvement of welfare policy will help to consolidate the regime. On the other 
hand, Donaldson (Chapter 5) sees worsening conditions for China’s farmers 
and other “have- nots” as the Xi administration’s doubling down on both urban-
ization and recentralization compels the adjustment of the administrative hier-
archy. Leng (Chapter 7) sees cultural policy becoming increasingly difficult, 
accentuating the contradictions between cultural development and cultural 
preservation.
 Despite this lack of consensus on the optimism–pessimism continuum, most 
writers foresee a continuation of the uneasy tension between central and local 
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governments. The current attempts to rebalance power through recentralization 
do little to change the core nature of the interaction – far deeper reform is 
needed to fundamentally alter the relationship between central and local gov-
ernments. For instance, Yeo observes (Chapter 3) that the necessary recentrali-
zation of investment policy does little to reduce the local governments’ 
investment hunger. Similarly, Hsu argues (Chapter 2) that the principal problem 
with fiscal policy is the “moral hazard” faced by local governments, and this 
shows no signs of changing. Chung (Chapter 6) also emphasizes that what he 
sees as an inherently complex and diversified local situation will exacerbate 
information asymmetries, which will further exacerbate the center’s reliance on 
the local for policy implementation. Thus, most chapter authors foresee a con-
tinuation of the status quo conflict between central and local governments – a 
conflict that is not zero- sum, but that is a conflict nonetheless. The ruling 
dilemma that China has experienced for millennia means that an analysis such as 
this will probably always represent a mid- term report, and will never be the final 
word on the state of central–local relations.
Notes
1 The ranks of the original deputy- provincial municipalities dropped from 16 to 15 when 
Chongqing was promoted to become a provincial- level government in 1997 (Chung 
2009).
2 The other types of prefecture- level units are in minority areas – these include auto-
nomous prefectures (zi zhi zhou) and leagues (meng), which act similarly to each other.
3 Thus it is confusing that a municipality in China could be on any of four levels: provin-
cial, sub- provincial, prefectural, county. For more on this see Chung 2004.
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